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Abstract
Most professional economists believe that economist in general are more selfish than other
persons and that this greater selfishness is due to economic education. In this paper we offer
empirical evidence against this widely held belief. Using a unique data set about giving
behaviour to two social funds at the University of Zurich, it is shown that economic training
does not make people act more selfish. However, the ‘natural experiment’ supports the
hypothesis that the different behaviour of economist can be explained by a selection effect.
JEL classification: A13, A20, H41
Keywords: Economists, Public Good, Giving Behaviour
                                                
∗ Bruno S. Frey is professor, and Stephan Meier is research assistant, of economics at the University of Zurich.
Address: Institute for Empirical Economic Research, University of Zurich, Blümlisalpstrasse 10, 8006 Zurich,
Tel.: 0041-1-634 37 28, Fax: 0041-1-634 49 07, E-mail: bsfrey@iew.unizh.ch, smeier@iew.unizh.ch. We thank
... for helpful remarks.
2Most professional economists, and probably most other scholars, seem to believe that the
following statements are a fact beyond doubt:
(1) Economists are more selfish than other persons,
(2) Economists’ higher selfishness is at least partly due to the economics education.
Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993, 1996) thus seem to have convinced the academic
community. Using Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments they found that economics majors (at a
particular American university) are more self-interested than non-majors, and that this is
caused in part by their training in economics. They conclude that there is ”... a heavy burden
of proof on those who insist that economics training does not inhibit cooperation”(1996:192).
But the literature on the topic has reached much less uniform results than this statement as
well as the view held among many scholars suggest. While Carter and Iron (1991:174) using
an Ultimatum Game experiment find that ”economists are born, not made”, Yezer, Goldfarb
and Poppen (1996:177) using a ”lost letter” experiment even claim that economists are ”...
actually substantially more cooperative than ... their counterparts studying other subjects”1.
These inconsistent conclusions are all based on experiments with students. An exception is
Laband and Beil (1999) who look at how far the professional associations’ income-based dues
structures without enforcement mechanism are observed. For that purpose they undertake a
survey of the members’ ”true” income and find that sociologists are more prepared to cheat
than either economists or political scientists. But this study does not control for personality
variables, and cannot discriminate between the so-called selection and indoctrination effect.
Therefore "[t]he effect of training and/or self-selection on cooperation remains a wide-open
problem" (Ledyard 1995: 161).
We are able to use a unique and extremely large data set (more than 57,000 observations) to
study the behavior of economics students in a natural setting, to compare it with that of
students of other disciplines, and to analyze whether a possible difference in behavior is due
to the indoctrination in the economics training. We reach significantly different results from
all the other studies:
(1) Political economists are not more selfish than the average of all other students, but
students of business are much more selfish.
                                                
1 Further studies unable to find an negative effect on cooperation of economics education are Marwell and Ames
(1981), Frey, Pommerehne and Gygi (1993), Bohnet und Frey (1995), Seguino, Steven and Lutz (1996), Cadsby
and Maynes (1998), Stanley and Tran (1998), and Frank and Schulz (2000).
3(2) The higher selfishness of business students is due to self-selection, not indoctrination.
(3) Students of the economic sciences (i.e. both political and business economists) are about
as selfish as students of law but much less so than medical and veterinary students.
It follows that political economists can be more comfortable with their subject than most of
them believe – it is in this respect not a dismal science. Professors of political economics
cannot be faulted. But business schools should be fully aware that they attract particularly
selfish students and should take that into account in their decisions. Our findings also serve to
reject the often-heard claim2 that political economists create the type of selfish persons (the
homo oeconomicus) they axiomatically assume in their theories.
Section I discusses the data and section II presents the analysis and results of our inquiry.
Section III draws conclusions.
I. The Data
All students of the University of Zurich have to decide every semester if they want to
contribute to two official social funds - additionally to the compulsory fee. On the official
letter for renewing their registration the students are asked if they voluntarily want to give a
specific amount (CHF 7.-, about US$ 5) to a fund which gives cheap loans to needy students
and/or a specific amount (CHF 5.-, about US$ 3.30) to a fund supporting foreigners to study at
the University of Zurich. Students also have the choice not to contribute to any fund at all.
The students confirm their decision with their signatures. Our data refers to the decisions
taken in the winter term 1998/99, the summer term 1999 and the winter term 1999/2000. The
fact that every student of the University of Zurich has to decide every semester if he or she is
willing to contribute to one or both of the social funds generates a large number of
observations (the decisions of the three terms are pooled; N=57,510). Problems of a selection
bias of the subject-pool are minimal. The data enable to compare the effect of studying
different disciplines3 on cooperative behavior and provides the opportunity to control for a
possible effect of economics training.
                                                
2 See Kelman (1987) and Ostrom (1998). The latter warns: "We are producing generations of cynical citizens
with little trust in one another, much less in their government. Given the central role of trust in solving social
dilemmas, we may be creating the very conditions that undermine our own democratic ways of life" (p. 18).
3 The University of Zurich is the biggest university in Switzerland with overall 20,000 students and offers the
whole rang of disciplines which can be studied in Switzerland.
4The organization of the study of economics at the University of Zurich allows us to control for
different levels of economic knowledge. In a first phase the students undertake the basic
study, which takes about 2 years. After passing an exam covering the basics of micro- and
macroeconomics they enter the main phase and choose between political or business
economics. After graduating, the students may take up their PhD study. Students can already
specialize in economics in high school. We control for this pre-university knowledge (in
economics).4
The strict official procedures applied when renewing student' registration offers a controlled
environment while using a natural setting. The results can therefore be well compared with
giving in laboratory experiments of fairness games. Moreover the amounts in question are
similar to those that have been used in the experiments for analyzing the issue mentioned.
II. Analysis and Results
A look at the raw data seems to indicate that economists are more selfish than other students.
While 60.2 percent of the economics students contribute to at least one of the funds, 67.6
percent of the students with other majors do so. In the following section the two possible
explanations for this pattern of behavior will be tested: (1) selfish individuals study economics
(selection hypothesis). The difference in giving behavior is therefore independent of training
in economics. (2) The students adapt their behavior over time to the basic axiom of the theory
they study (indoctrination hypothesis). Throughout their study economic students become
more selfish according to the principles of the economic theory. Because the two explanations
are not mutually exclusive it is important to discriminate between the two hypothesis.
1. Is there a selection effect?
To discriminate between the selection and the indoctrination hypothesis we look at the
decision to contribute when first entering the university (freshmen). Differences between
students of the various disciplines at the very beginning of studies (without having had any
lecture in economics) supports the selection hypothesis. To account for economic knowledge
                                                
4 Since a special dummy variable for students who did not pass their high school in Switzerland (therefore no
information about potential pre-university knowledge in economics was available) did not prove to have an
5acquired at high school, a possible pre-university economics training is controlled for (pre-
university knowledge). In the appendix a description of variables is provided.
Table 1 presents the results of a probit analysis. Control variables are personal factors (age,
gender, nationality), number of semesters and a dummy variables for the periods.
TABLE 1
The estimate is used to test whether the extent of giving is influenced by being subjected to
economic theories. The dichotomous dependent variable equals 1 if the student contributes to
at least one fund, and equals 0 if the student decides not to give any money.
The first part of Table 1 suggests that a selection effect exists. Economists in the broad sense
(students can not decide between business and political economics until they reach the main
phase of their studies) donate less to the fund compared to non-economists. Because in a
probit analysis the coefficient is not easy to interpret, marginal effects are computed that show
how the probability to contribute changes compared to the reference group. The probability
that an economist contributes is more than 2 percent less than for a non-economist. To show
that this lower willingness to contribute persists at the very beginning of the study the variable
for economists has to be jointly interpreted with "being a very beginner" (freshmen) and with
"being a freshman in economics" (freshmen*economist). The results suggest that already at
the very first decision of whether to contribute (it takes place before the first lecture in
economics), the economics students act more selfishly than non-economists do.5
The estimate also controls for pre-university education: having a high school education with
an economics orientation significantly reduces the propensity to donate to other students. The
probability to contribute is 3.7 percentage points lower. The personality variables show the
following effects: All other influences being equal, the older a student is, the more likely he or
she is prepared to contribute to the fund. Women and foreigners are less prepared to give. The
same holds for the number of semesters a student stays at the university. This last variable
suggests that repetition tends to reduce giving.
                                                                                                                                                        
effect, it was not taken into account.
5 The overall lower probability (-6.6 percent) at the very first decision cannot be compared to first period
decisions in public goods experiments, where contribution is normally highest (see e.g. Ledyard 1995). The
freshmen at the University of Zurich decide before being to classes and without meeting any other students. Thus
between the first and the following decisions changes an important variable which can best be describe as 'social
distance'. For social distance see Bohnet and Frey (1999) and Hoffman et al. (1996).
62. Is there an indoctrination effect?
If the differences in giving behavior between the students of economics and the other
disciplines increases with every additional semester the indoctrination hypothesis could not be
rejected. In order to capture the specific knowledge in economics we compare the behavior of
the students in every stage of their studies. The reference group is constituted by non-
economists in the first phase of their studies. A move from the basic study to the main phase
of the university education raises students’ preparedness to help other students financially by
3.1 percentage points. In contrast, for economics students entering the main phase of studies,
the probability of contributing to the fund is reduced by 8.3 percentage points. But this result
cannot be interpreted as indicating the impact of indoctrination because the probability to
contribute rises for doctoral students in economics by 11.1 percentage points while for
doctoral students in other disciplines the willingness to donate fall by 4.2 percentage points. If
indoctrination really influenced the behavior of students, the effect should be strongest at the
doctoral level where the students have absorbed the largest amount of economics teaching.
Thus the data do not support a negative effect of economics training on giving. This result is
further supported first by looking at two groups of economics students and second by
comparing the behavior of students of economics with students in other academic disciplines.
This is done in the following section.
73. Different behavior of students of political and business economics
Table 2 focuses on the differences in contributing to the fund between the two types of
students of the economic sciences, on the one side ”political economists” and on the other
side "business economists".
TABLE 2
Students are allowed to choose between the two variants of economics only in the main phase
of their studies after they pass the basic study of their studies (after approximately two years).
Controlling for all the factors previously also included in Table 1, political economists do not
differ from all the other students. In contrast, the probability of business students to contribute
to the social funds is more than 8 percent lower. This difference cannot be explained by the
training in economics, first because students of political economy do not show any
(statistically significant) behavioral differences to non-economics students, and, second, on a
doctoral level the willingness to donate money increases for business students compared to
non-economists, while political economist again do not differ significantly from the reference
group.
4. Comparison to students of other disciplines
Table 3 compares the contribution by the students of the various disciplines again holding
constant the personality and other variables previously included in Table 1.
TABLE 3
In the reference group are students in the faculty of arts which constitutes the biggest faculty
at the University of Zurich (roughly 8600 students). Looking at the ”pure” effect of one’s
chosen subject, students of the economics faculty are about as selfish as law students while a
much higher share of the students of theology are prepared to subsidize other students.
When students move to the main phase of studies all are prepared to give 2.5 percentage
points more but large differences between disciplines emerge. For instance, being a student of
veterinary medicine lowers the probability of paying into the funds by more than 12
percentage points compared to the reference group. Business economics students give 8.5
percentage points less than art students – but this is still substantially more than veterinary
students. Students of political economy give the same amount as students of the arts faculty.
Our results suggest that economists are by far not the most selfish.
8When students graduate and take up their Ph.D. studies the probability that they donate money
rises 3.6 percentage points. Students of medicine, of law, and of veterinary medicine give less
(12.4, 9.2 and 8.6 percentage points, respectively). At the Ph.D. stage both political and
business economists exhibit the same preparedness to give than students in the arts faculty.
Business economists do not show less altruistic behavior at this most advanced stage of their
studies.
5. Testing for other determinants of giving behavior
The question of whether there is an indoctrination or a self-selection effect is further studied
with the help of an anonymous on-line survey among the same student population of the
University of Zurich as the data set on giving behavior.6 The response rate was 25 percent,
and 2,321 answers could be used. While this sample is not totally representative (not
surprisingly a larger share of economics students responded to the questionnaire sent out by
two economists) it is certainly not strongly biased. With respect to gender and age the sample
corresponds to the distribution of students at the University of Zurich. The most important
question asked was again whether a person contributes money to one or both of the funds. 73
percent responded that they did, compared to the 66 percent who actually did. Such
differences between survey answers and actual behavior have also been observed with respect
to voting behavior (see Matsusaka and Palda 1999). The main purpose of the survey is to
better control for factors affecting giving behavior unconnected to the issue of indoctrination
versus selection. The survey allows us to determine the income position, assuming that the
better off a student is, the more he or she is prepared to help others. Those students working
on the market to finance their studies (which is a significant part of the students at the
University of Zurich) are expected to donate the less the more percentage of their living they
finance by themselves. In contrast, when the parents foot the bill to study (and therefore the
contribution to the funds), it is likely that the students are more generous to their fellow
students. In addition, various motives for giving money to the fund were asked: its perceived
necessity and effectiveness, the perceived importance of individual participation (on a scale
ranging from 1 to 8 with a 'No Opinion' option; 8 = the strongest emphasis on necessity and
effectiveness of the funds, and for the importance of individual participation), one’s political
orientation on a left/right spectrum (ranging from 1 to 8; 8= the most left), and the
expectations concerning the contribution of other students.
9Table 4 presents the probit estimates again controlling for age, gender and the number of
semesters.
TABLE 4
The survey again suggests that the giving behavior of political economists does not differ
significantly from non-economist but that the students of business give significantly less. The
large marginal effect of doctoral students in business economics of more than 35% is a sign
that there is no indoctrination effect. If it existed it would surely be the doctoral students who
would be least prepared to donate. In Table 4 economists in the broad sense tend to be more
inclined to contribute to the funds than non-economists do. This is due to their different
values and political orientation compared to non-economist. Economists are more critical
towards the funds and tend to be more on the right side of the political spectrum – both factors
lower the probability of donation. Because we control in Table 4 for these variables the
coefficient for economist in the broad sense gets positive. The differences in values and
political orientation do not change the behavior of business economist throughout the study
and exist already at the beginning of the studies and are independent of economics training.
They therefore support also the selection hypothesis that business economists are a special
bunch of people.
The results for the income situation and the values do not surprise. Income has the expected
strong positive effect on giving. The more a student finances his own living the less he or she
is willing to contribute. The fact that the parents pay the fee does not change the probability of
one's own decision to donate. The variables reflecting students' values all have the expected
sign and are statistically significant. The expectation regarding how many others donate
money correlates positively with the decision to contribute. The variables used as controls are
(with one expectation) all statistically significant and have the expected sign.
III. Conclusions
The analysis of the actual behavior of the students with respect to donating money to a fund as
a pure public good, as well as an on-line survey of the same population, allows us to draw
three conclusions:
(1) Political economists do not behave much differently from other students;
(2) It is the students of business economics who give significantly less than other students;
                                                                                                                                                        
6 The on-line questionnaire is reproduced at http://www.iew.unizh.ch/grp/frey/fragebogen.htm
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(3) The lower contribution of business economists compared to other students is due to self-
selection rather than indoctrination.
These conclusions are based on real life behavior of students at the University of Zurich but
they are likely to be of general relevance. Zurich provides a good example for a student body
in a relatively large city (approximately one million inhabitants). The students of economics
on which the study focuses receive a similar education in their discipline as do their
counterparts elsewhere, in particular in the United States (for example, many of the textbooks
used are American). As a considerable share of the students are at the same time in gainful
employment, they tend to be in close contact with the rest of the population. The results
reached may therefore well apply to the behavior of economists in general, i.e. outside the
university setting.
The conclusions drawn are important for two quite different reasons:
- Political economists need not fear that they have a negative effect on students’ behavior
with respect to altruistic giving. The students, and in particular the graduates studying for
a doctoral degree, well understand that political economics does not offer any normative
advice with respect to giving.
- The charge often made against political economists that they produce the type of selfish
homo oeconomicus they assume in their theories is unfounded.
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Appendix
Description of variables
Contribution to Fund Sample
Economic education: Dummies for economists in the broad sense, for political and for
business economists, and for high school knowledge in economics. The reference group is
non-economists without high school knowledge in economics.
Dummies for students of every faculty and interaction terms with the stage of study
respectively. The reference group is students of the arts faculty.
Stage of study: Dummies for freshmen (students entering university), the main phase and the
Ph.D. stage. The reference group is students in their basic study. Interaction terms linking the
dummies for economists and the stage of study.
Demographic factors: Dummies for age between 26-30, 30-35, 36-40 and over 40, for female,
and for foreigners. The reference groups is people with age under 26, male and Swiss citizen.
The number of semester at the University of Zurich and the number of semester squared.
Survey Sample
Economic Education: See above.
Income situation: Log of income at one's disposal per month. Share of living costs financed by
the students themselves. Dummy when the parents cover the fees going to the university. The
reference group is students who pay the fee by their own.
Values: Perceived necessity and effectiveness of the funds and perceived importance of
individual participation on a scale from 1 to 8 with a ‘No Opinion’ option; 8=the strongest
emphasis on necessity and effectiveness of the funds, and for the importance of individual
participation. Political orientation on a scale from 1 to 8; 8= the most left. Expectations about
the behavior of others in percent (the question was: What do you think is the share of students
who contribute to one of the funds?).
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Table 1
Contribution of Economists and Non-Economists
University of Zurich 1989-1999
Dichotomous dependent variable: 'Contribution to at least one fund' = 1
Probit estimates
Variable coefficient z-value marginal
effect
Economist (1 = economist) -0.070* -2.199 -2.5%
Stages of study
Freshmen -0.182** -7.454 -6.6%
Freshmen*Economist 0.017 0.257 0.6%
Main phase 0.084** 5.411 3.1%
Main phase*Economist -0.229** -5.656 -8.3%
Ph.D. -0.115** -6.633 -4.2%
Ph.D.*Economist 0.306** 5.080 11.1%
Pre-university knowledge -0.103** -7.037 -3.7%
Control variables
Age 26-30 -0.009 -0.573 -0.3%
Age 31-35 0.187** 8.596 6.8%
Age 36-40 0.341** 11.755 12.3%
Age over 40 0.517** 16.424 18.7%
Gender (female=1) -0.030** -2.657 -1.1%
Nationality (foreigner=1) -0.077** -4.431 -2.8%
Number of semester -0.045** -17.515 -1.6%
(Number of semester)2 0.001** 10.379 0.02%
Period 2 (summer term 1999) 0.071** 10.014 2.6%
Period 3 (winter term 99/00) 0.139** 10.510 5.0%
Constant 0.690** 34.518
N 57,510
Log Likelihood -35809.65
Pseudo R2 0.020
Notes: Reference group is 'non-economists', 'basic study', 'without pre-university
economic knowledge', 'age under 26', 'male', 'Swiss', 'semester 1998/99'.
Level of significance: * 0.01<p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Source: Compiled on the data provided by the department of accounting of the
University of Zurich.
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Table 2
Contribution of Political and Business Economists
University of Zurich 1989-1999
Dichotomous dependent variable: 'Contribution to at least one fund' = 1
Probit estimates
Variable coefficient z-value marginal
effect
Economist (in the broad sense) -0.106** -3.821 -3.9%
Stages of study
Freshmen -0.184** -7.537 -6.7%
Freshmen*Economist 0.049 0.77 1.8%
Main phase 0.075** 4.919 2.7%
Main phase*Political Economist 0.003 0.035 0.1%
Main phase*Business Economist -0.226** -5.652 -8.2%
Ph.D. -0.111** -6.415 -4.0%
Ph.D.*Political Economist 0.168 1.315 6.1%
Ph.D.*Business Economist 0.294** 4.028 10.6%
Pre-university economic knowledge -0.103** -7.071 -3.8%
Control variables
Age 26-30 -0.008 -0.485 -0.3%
Age 31-35 0.188** 8.633 6.8%
Age 36-40 0.341** 11.760 12.3%
Age over 40 0.518** 16.442 18.7%
Gender (female=1) -0.029** -2.578 -1.0%
Nationality (foreigner=1) -0.076** -4.398 -2.8%
Numbers of semester -0.045** -17.515 -1.6%
(Number of semester)2 0.001** 10.388 0%
Period 2 (summer term 1999) 0.072** 5.285 2.6%
Period 3 (winter term 1999/00) 0.142** 10.711 5.1%
Constant 0.695** 34.956
N 57,510
Log Likelihood -35883.329
Pseudo R2 0.0181
Notes: Reference group is 'non-economists', 'basic study', 'without pre-university economic
knowledge', 'age under 26', 'male', 'Swiss', 'semester 1998/99'.
Level of significance: * 0.01<p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Source: Compiled on the data provided by the department of accounting of the University of
Zurich.
15
Table 3
Contribution of Economists and Students of Other Faculties
University of Zurich 1989-1999
Dichotomous dependent variable: 'Contribution to at least one funds' = 1, Probit estimates
Variable coefficient z-value Marginal effect
Economics -0.177** -5.163 -6.4%
Theology 0.235* 2.521 8.5%
Law -0.182** -5.011 -6.6%
Medicine 0.041 1.012 1.5%
Veterinary medicine -0.070 -1.158 -2.5%
Natural science -0.038 -0.915 -1.4%
Informatic -0.054 -0.997 -2.0%
Main phase* 0.068* 2.197 2.5%
Political economics -0.002 -0.021 -0.1%
Business economics -0.234** -5.272 -8.5%
Theology 0.015 0.107 0.5%
Law -0.062 -1.468 -2.2%
Medicine -0.130* -2.545 -4.7%
Veterinary medicine -0.350** -3.99 -12.6%
Natural science -0.139** -2.791 -5.0%
Computer Science -0.158 -1.948 -5.7%
Ph.D.* 0.099** 3.481 3.6%
Political economics -0.026 -0.199 -0.9%
Business economics 0.087 1.136 3.1%
Law -0.256** -5.245 -9.2%
Theology -0.282 -1.815 -10.2%
Medicine -0.342** -7.103 -12.4%
Veterinary medicine -0.239** -2.706 -8.6%
Computer Science 0.013 0.264 0.5%
Natural science -0.195 -1.571 -7.0%
Pre-university economic knowledge -0.076** -5.135 -2.8%
N 57,510
Log Likelihood -35590.254
Pseudo R2 0.0261
Notes: Reference group is 'students of the arts faculty', 'basic study', 'without pre-university
economic knowledge', 'age under 26', 'male', 'Swiss', 'semester 1998/99'. Due to lack
of space the control variable of table 1 are not shown in the table.
* the variables below are interaction terms.
Level of significance: * 0.01<p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Source: Compiled on the data provided by the department of accounting of the University of
Zurich.
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Table 4
Factors Affecting the Giving Behavior
University of Zurich 2000
Dichotomous dependent variable: 'Contribution to at least one fund' = 1
Probit estimates
Variable Coefficient z-value marginal
effect
Economist (in the broad sense) 0.391** 2.829 11.3%
Stages of study
Main phase 0.080 0.944 2.3%
Main phase*Political Economist -0.208 -0.648 -6.0%
Main phase*Business Economist -0.413* -2.087 -12.0%
Ph.D. 0.119 0.947 3.5%
Ph.D.*Political Economist 0.156 0.261 4.5%
Ph.D.*Business Economist 1.234 1.614 35.7%
Income situation
Log (income) 0.188** 3.88 5.5%
Percent of own living -0.003* -2.249 -0.1%
Parents pay fees 0.067 0.785 2.0%
Values
Importance to contribute 0.241** 10.963 7.0%
Necessity of funds 0.095** 3.49 2.7%
Effectiveness of funds 0.085** 3.235 2.5%
No opinion 'importance' 0.851** 4.84 24.6%
No opinion 'necessity' 0.367(*) 1.893 10.6%
No opinion 'effectiveness' 0.479** 3.065 13.9%
Political orientation 0.060** 2.617 1.8%
Expectation about behavior of
others
0.019** 11.327 0.6%
Control variables
Age 0.016(*) 1.917 0.5%
Sex (female=1) -0.180** -2.627 -5.2%
Number of semester -0.019* -2.505 -0.6%
Constant -4.780** -11.393
N 2,321
Log likelihood -979.11015
R2 0.2653
Notes: Reference group is 'non-economists', 'basic study', 'male', who 'pay the fee by
themselves'.
Level of significance: (*) 0.05<p<0.1, * 0.01<p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Source: Own survey at the University of Zurich.
